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JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENTS IN THE NEWSPAPER
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FREEDOMS
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To America, the newspaper business has always entailed far
more than the selling of newspapers. Even publishers, whose ulti-
mate focus is on the bottom line, recognize the magnitude of their
responsibility to inform, educate, and entertain the public. Because
publishers manifest their viewpoints not only on the editorial page
but also through the scope, focus, and concentration of news cover-
age,' the public benefits accruing from a free press are maximized by
the existence of independent sources of news and opinion.
American courts traditionally have acknowledged that the mar-
ketplace of ideas realizes its greatest potential when the public is
exposed to autonomous, competitive daily newspapers: "[the first
amendment] rests on the assumption that the widest possible dis-
semination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is
essential to the welfare of the public ... ."' Desire to safeguard this
interest' and to halt the rapid decline of two-newspaper cities moti-
vated Congress to enact the Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970
("NPA").4
The NPA adopted the premise that given the high costs of entry
and competition, a competitive newspaper industry could not exist
under the constraints of existing antitrust laws.5 Accordingly, the
NPA sanctioned an exemption from those laws for joint newspaper
t B.S. 1987, J.D. Candidate 1990, University of Pennsylvania. Special thanks to
Dan Segal for his assistance.
I See B. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 16-17 (2d ed. 1987) (stating that
while some publishers promote their self-interest by mandating or banning the
editorial coverage of important news subjects, most publishers more subtly maintain
control over news content through "the power to treat some subjects accurately but
briefly, to treat other subjects accurately and in depth, ... [and by] carefully avoiding
some subjects and enthusiastically pursuing others").
2 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see also Lively, Fear and
the Media: A First Amendment Horror Show, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (1985)
("Content diversity in print is regarded, at least by the judiciary, as both essential to
and a barometer of society's health.").
3 See 116 CONG. REC. 2009 (1970) (statement of Sen. Moss) ("[Tihe purpose of
the act is to preserve editorial voices ... .
4 15 U.S.C. § 1801 (1982).
5 See 116 CONG. REc. 23,148 (1970) (statement of Rep. McCulloch) ("It is the
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operating agreements ("JOAs"), which merge the operations and
physical facilities of a "failing newspaper" 6 with those of its competi-
tor on the condition that the two newspapers maintain autonomous
editorial and reportorial staffs.7 The Act grants participants inJOAs
immunity from general antitrust laws and permits them to engage in
such otherwise illicit practices as price-fixing, profit-pooling, and
market allocation.
Proponents of the NPA envisionedJOAs as cost-effective substi-
tutes for competitive newspapers that would ensure the continued
existence of autonomous sources of news and opinion. However,
the practical effect ofJOAs has been to place a stranglehold on both
the newspaper market and the marketplace of ideas. The financial
advantages gained by newspapers engaging in JOAs deter new mar-
ket entrants and inhibit smaller existing competitors while aug-
menting the substantial concentration of power in large newspaper
chains.
Rather than preserving the existence of "diverse and antagonis-
tic" voices, the Newspaper Preservation Act has merely preserved
the status quo: the NPA has constrained, rather than furthered, first
amendment interests. Newspapers operating under JOAs generally
fail to provide greater depth of coverage or editorial diversity than
monopolistic newspapers. The NPA is also impossible to implement:
congressional enforcement of the conditions of editorial and repor-
torial autonomy necessarily entails government entry into the news-
room, thereby violating the first amendment.
The NPA's failure may be traced to a fundamental flaw in its
underlying premise: the first amendment goal of providing varied
sources of news and opinion is consistent with, rather than mutually
exclusive of, the antitrust laws.' The NPA accords the newspaper
industry special, favorable economic treatment that inherently
impedes true competitivejournalism. The NPA's exemption ofJOAs
potentially conflicting interest of commercial competition and editorial competition
that we have pondered in our consideration of the Newspaper Preservation Act.").
6 The NPA defines a "failing newspaper" as "a newspaper publication which,
regardless of its ownership or affiliations, is in probable danger of financial failure."
15 U.S.C. § 1802(5) (1982). For further discussion of the implications of this
definition, see infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (1982).
8 See 116 CONG. REc. 2009 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hart) ("If the objective of
the Congress is to preserve newspaper competition and encourage a multiplicity of
editorial voices it should insist on strict enforcement of the antitrust laws and should
not permit them to be weakened.").
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from the antitrust laws thus effectively thwarts the public interest in
"diverse and antagonistic sources."
This Comment urges that the NPA's effectiveness be re-
examined in light of the Act's consequences and effects. Part I out-
lines the background of the American newspaper industry. Part II
explains the ways in which the NPA has failed to achieve its avowed
goals of enhanced editorial diversity and improved quality of news
coverage. Part III addresses the NPA's potential infringement of
first amendment rights, both in conditioning the antitrust exemption
on a content-based analysis of the newspapers' editorial and reporto-
rial independence and in creating barriers to entry in the.newspaper
industry.
The need to reevaluate the NPA is particularly compelling in
light of the Supreme Court's recent decision to hear Michigan Citizens
for an Independent Press v. Thornburgh.9 The appellants in Michigan Citi-
zens have challenged the Department of Justice's standard for grant-
ing JOAs as unduly permissive and have asserted that the antitrust
exemptions allowed under the NPA serve as a catalyst provoking,
rather than preventing, the collapse of independent competitive
newspapers. Specifically, the appellants seek to halt the proposed
JOA between the Detroit Free Press and The Detroit News on the grounds
that neither newspaper is "failing" with sufficient certainty to war-
rant the drastic relief of aJOA. 10 Although Michigan Citizens has been
submitted and argued primarily on antitrust grounds, the Court
should consider the critical threats to first amendment freedoms that
are posed when JOAs are too readily sanctioned.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY
The twentieth century has witnessed a dramatic decline in the
number of cities served by more than one daily newspaper. In 1910,
more than one-half of all "newspaper" cities enjoyed daily competi-
tion among as many as five or six newspapers; by 1986, however,
newspaper monopolies had eliminated that competition in ninety-
eight percent of these cities."1 This decline has been attributed pri-
marily to economic developments unique to the newspaper industry.
9 868 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1952 (1989); see infra text
accompanying notes 116-23.
10 See supra note 6 and accompanying text; infra notes 80-90 and accompanying
text.
I I See B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 1, at 74. "Newspaper" cities are cities in which at
least one daily newspaper is published. See id.
1989]
278 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 138:275
The emergence and growth of broadcast media during the latter
part of this century created new sources of rivalry for local advertis-
ing revenue; daily newspapers found themselves in competition not
only with each other but also with television and a "resurgent" radio
industry.' 2 The additional competition tightened a market already
beset by financial constraints.1
3
Because newspapers operate on economies of scale, new
entrants and smaller competitors have difficulty raising and main-
taining sufficient capital. Similarly, larger established competitors
must constantly battle against the "downward spiral" caused by the
combined impact of declining circulation and diminishing advertis-
ing revenue.
The "downward spiral" effect reflects the unique relationship
between circulation and advertising revenue that characterizes the
newspaper industry. A newspaper can achieve an economy of scale
only by increasing its circulation and can meet the costs of attaining
such additional circulation only by attracting incremental advertising
revenue. Thus, in a competitive market, a newspaper that gains an
edge in circulation quickly secures a proportional advantage in reve-
nue from advertisers seeking to reach the maximum number of read-
ers. Because advertisers are generally less concerned with price than
potential audience size, the weaker paper is precluded from effective
competition. 4 Furthermore, a circulation loss triggers both a pro-
portionally greater loss of advertising revenue and a corresponding
decline in news quality as funds that otherwise would have been allo-
cated to news coverage instead are applied to offset the higher costs
accompanying smaller circulation. The effect is a vicious "downward
spiral" that is "rarely reversed."' 5
Joint newspaper operating arrangements were initially devel-
oped to allow weaker newspapers to escape this cycle while preserv-
ing autonomous editorial voices.' 6 JOAs existed long before the
12 See Martel & Haydel, Judicial Application of the Newspaper Preservation Act: Will
Congressional Intent Be Relegated to the Back Pages?. 1984 B.Y.U. L. REv. 123, 130; see also
Note, Newspaper Preservation Act: A Critique, 46 IND. L.J. 392, 395 (1970) (stating that
proponents of the NPA blame the decline in two-newspaper cities on increased
competition from radio and television).
13 The effect of competition was particularly acute in urban neighborhoods,
where blue-collar workers preferred the more "easily digested" material featured in
broadcast news. See Martel & Haydel, supra note 12, at 130.
14 For a more detailed explanation of the downward spiral effect, see Media and
the First Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 867, 894 (1972) [hereinafter Media and
the First Amendment]; Note, supra note 12, at 395 & n.21.
15 See Martel & Haydel, supra note 12, at 130.
16 See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
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enactment of the NPA in 1970. The first JOA was formed in Albu-
querque, New Mexico, in 1933, and twenty-two JOAs had been
implemented by the time of the Act's passage.
1 7
The NPA was precipitated by allegations that JOAs violated
national antitrust laws. In 1969, the Supreme Court addressed the
legality of JOAs in Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States. 8 The Citizen
Publishing Court upheld a district, court decision to invalidate theJOA
between the Citizen and The Arizona Daily Star as violative of sections
one and two of the Sherman Act 9 and section eighteen of the Clay-
ton Act." The Court specifically objected to the JOA's sanctioning
of three types of controls-price fixing, profit pooling, and market
control. 2 The decision did not directly outlaw JOAs but rather
required a revision of the Tucson JOA that would eliminate the
offensive provisions.
22
In ruling the violations "plain beyond peradventure," the Citizen
Publishing Court noted that "[the only real defense of the] appellants
was the 'failing company' defense-a judicially created doctrine."
23
This doctrine permits an exemption to the antitrust laws when a
company would face certain failure if no action were taken. The
Court noted, however, that the failing company doctrine had tradi-
tionally been limited to instances in which the prospect of rehabilita-
tion was so remote that the company "faced the grave probability of
a business failure" and in which "no other prospective purchaser"
existed.24 The Court consequently held that because there was no
evidence that the owners of the weaker Citizen were even contemplat-
ing a sale or other alternative to the JOA, the failing company doc-
trine could not be invoked. 5
17 See S. OPPENHEIM & C. SHIELDS, NEWSPAPERS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWs 187
(1981).
18 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
19 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982).
20 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
21 See Citizen Publishing, 394 U.S. at 135-36. Price-fixing is "[t]he cooperative
setting of price levels or ranges by competing firms." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1070
(5th ed. 1979). Profit-pooling is the agreement between firms in a combination to
share the profits obtained through that combination. See id. at 1045. Market control
results from the agreement between those firms to concentrate on particular target
areas so that the combination will dominate the entire market. See 3 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTrrRuST LAW § 703, at 111-14 (1978).
22 See Citizen Publishing, 394 U.S. at 135.
23 Id. at 135-36.
24 Id. at 137 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930)).
25 See id. ("[T]here is no evidence that the joint operating agreement was the last
straw at which the Citizen grasped.").
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Concern over the far-reaching implications of the Citizen Publish-
ing decision induced powerful newspaper groups to lobby Congress
for statutory support forJOAs, culminating in the Newspaper Preser-
vation Act of 1970. The NPA permits JOAs to engage in the activi-
ties prohibited by Citizen Publishing on the condition that one
newspaper qualify as "failing."26 The standard of failure was defined
far more broadly than in Citizen Publishing, requiring only that a news-
paper, "regardless of its ownership or affiliations, is in probable dan-
ger of financial failure."
27
II. FAILURE OF THE NPA TO ACHIEVE ITS AVOWED GOALS
A. Lack of Need for an Exemption Under the Antitrust Laws
The less stringent standards sanctioned by the NPA ostensibly
promote the first amendment interest in protecting the dissemina-
tion of "diverse and antagonistic" sources of information.28 While
the importance of that concern is indisputable, no causal relationship
has been established between the NPA and the achievement of that
goal. Exemptions to the antitrust laws traditionally have been
granted only upon a showing of urgency and dire need;29 in the case
26 See 15 U.S.C. § 1803 (1982). Although the NPA did not explicitly mention
the practices outlawed by Citizen Publishing, it included an extremely broad definition
of "joint newspaper operating arrangement" in 15 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (1982), which
has been interpreted as establishing that "the main elements objected to in Citizen
Publishing, the joint determination of advertising and subscription rates and the
pooling of profits, are permissible in a [JOA] that meets the requirements of the
[NPA]." S. OPPENHEIM & C. SHIELDS, supra note 17, at 191; see also 116 CONG. REc.
23,146 (1970) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (admitting that most JOAs have
provisions allowing price-fixing, profit-pooling, and market allocation).
27 15 U.S.C. § 1802(5) (1982). The official reason for the less stringent
standard was recognition of the unique difficulties the newspaper industry faced in
combatting the downward spiral effect. See S. OPPENHEIM & C. SHIELDS, supra note 17,
at 193. Critics of the NPA, however, have charged that the standard was influenced
by the substantial power that large newspaper groups wielded over Congress and
President Nixon. See infra text accompanying notes 68-80.
28 For a discussion of more political motives that may have provided the true
impetus for the NPA's passage, see infra text accompanying notes 68-76.
29 The government will intervene in a "natural monopoly" market to simulate
the more egalitarian economic conditions that characterize competitive markets. See
L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 717 (1977). In implementing the NPA, however, the
government sanctioned monopolistic practices in an otherwise free market. See infra
notes 173-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the economic conditions
in the newspaper industry at the time of the NPA's passage did not constitute a
"natural monopoly." Similar exemptions have been granted for small businesses, see
15 U.S.C. § 640 (1982), and companies engaged in activities directly affecting
national defense, see 50 U.S.C. § 2158 (1982). The national defense exemption is
sustained by the government's compelling interest in protecting its citizens. See 1 P.
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of the NPA, however, both the necessity of such an exemption and
the effectiveness of antitrust exemptions in achieving editorial diver-
sity are unsubstantiated.30
Despite the undisputed findings documenting the inherent diffi-
culties in maintaining two-newspaper cities, the NPA's proponents
failed to establish either that the demise of all independent newspa-
per competition was inevitable or that the JOA was the only or best
means of circumventing this dilemma. Although one legislator cited
testimony that most of the newspapers that collapsed did so primar-
ily because of "failure of the paper to relate to the needs and wants
of [a changing] community,""1 Congress largely ignored the impact
of noneconomic factors such as mismanagement, poor or irrelevant
article content, and the migration of large numbers of readers from
the cities to the suburbs.3 2
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 21, § 230b, at 224-25. The small business
exemption is justified by its positive impact on the nation's economy and on the
grounds that many combinations of small businesses "have so little market power as
to be presumptively reasonable and therefore lawful under the Sherman Act § 1." Id.
§ 230c, at 225.
The exemption most analogous to the NPA is the Webb-Pomerene Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1982), which exempts from the antitrust laws agreements in the
course of export trade between associations formed solely for the purpose of
engaging in such trade. The Webb-Pomerene Act was deemed necessary to enable
American firms to compete on an equal level in a trade world dominated by cartels.
See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 21, § 230a, at 222. Like the NPA, the Webb-
Pomerene Act was supported by a powerful and influential lobby and involves
matters highly vulnerable to political pressures. See Hawk, International Antitrust Policy
and the 1982 Acts: The Continuing Need for Reassessment, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 201,227-
29 (1982); see also infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text (discussing the political
pressures influencing the NPA's passage). A successful challenge to the NPA could
potentially limit the Attorney General's authority to allow mergers under the export
trading exemption. See White & Wermiel, High Court to Hear Antitrust Challenge To
Merger of Detroit's Two Big Dailies, Wall St. J., May 2, 1989, at B5, col. 5.
30 "The antitrust laws embody concepts and principles which long have been
considered to be the bedrock of our economic institutions. Piecemeal exemptions
from the antitrust laws to cope with problems of particular industries have been
given reluctantly and only after there has been a clear showing of overriding need."
116 CONG. REC. 23,145 (1970) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (quoting Rep.
Celler); see also id. at 23,167 (statement of Rep. Edwards) ("[E]nactment of [the NPA]
would be such a major exemption of the Federal antitrust laws as to make it
unwise.").
31 116 CONG. REC. 2010 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hart) (quoting Ben
Bagdikian, who was then national news editor of the Washington Post).
32 See Note, The Newspaper Preservation Act: The Seattle Application, 1982 U. ILL. L.
REV. 669, 693. Congress also failed to acknowledge the possibility that technological
developments in the printing industry could "ease the economies of scale problem
and, in the long run, lead to a rebirth of competing daily newspapers." Shenefield,
Ownership Concentration in Newspapers, 65 A.B.A.J. 1332, 1332 (1979).
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Particularly troubling was Congress' willingness to relieve own-
ers and publishers of all responsibility for their predicaments. The
assumption that a newspaper's demise could be halted only by aJOA
obscured the fact that "costs . .. can be cut and have been cut by
many newspapers" both through labor-saving technology and pro-
duction and through more streamlined, efficient management. 33 In
a letter urging rejection of the NPA, the National Newspaper Associ-
ation noted the survival of competition among "independent, wholly
separate" newspapers in thirty-seven American cities and asked "why
the 'joint newspaper operators' benefitted by [the proposed NPA]
cannot also survive without special legislation?,
3 4
Congress' most glaring oversight, however, was its failure to
acknowledge the economic flexibility remaining in the newspaper
industry even after the ruling in Citizen Publishing. The Citizen Publish-
ing Court merely affirmed the illegality of JOAs that engaged in
price-fixing, profit-pooling, and market allocation-activities in
direct violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The decision did
not prohibit the joinder of printing, distribution, or other business
departments in compliance with existing antitrust laws. The Depart-
ment ofJustice indicated that the standards established in Citizen Pub-
lishing could be applied successfully to allJOAs in effect at the time of
that decision.
35
Even in the absence of monopolistic practices, the legal joinder
of business departments may be sufficient to sustain an otherwise
profitable newspaper: "The greatest economies result from merged
printing and distribution facilities and the courts have found that this
is not forbidden by the antitrust laws."-36 The potential savings
under such an arrangement preclude the argument thatJOAs are the
necessary-and the only-means of preventing the demise of two-
newspaper cities.
The "need" for an antitrust exemption is further obscured by
the lack of positive proof establishing that the monopolistic practices
permitted under the exemption are necessary to achieve successful
JOAs. 37 A prospectus filed by ajoint agreement half-owner with the
33 116 CONG. REc. 23,163 (1970) (statement of Rep. Brown).
34 Id. at 23,144 (statement of Rep. MacGregor) (quoting letter from the
National Newspaper Association (July 2, 1970)).
35 See id. at 23,150 (statement of Rep. MacGregor).
36 Id. at 23,175 (letter from Andrew J. Biemiller, Director of the Department of
Legislation for the AFL-CIO, to Rep. Kastenmeier).
37 See 116 CONG. REC. 23,156 (1970) (statement ofRep. Feighan) ("No evidence
has been presented which demonstrates that price fixing and profit pooling are
necessary to the successful joint operation of newspapers."); see also Mintz, What the
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Securities and Exchange Commission after the Citizen Publishing deci-
sion noted that requiring JOAs to conform to the standards estab-
lished in Citizen Publishing could increase costs and decrease profits;
the prospectus did not suggest that the decline in profitability would
force one of the newspapers to close." Failure to establish that
JOAs are essential to the preservation of independent newspapers
substantially weakens the premise on which the NPA was founded
and undermines the legitimacy of the Act. 9
Furthermore, JOAs have not proved an infallible remedy. The
first JOA approved after the NPA's passage took place between the
Anchorage Daily News and the Anchorage Times in 1974; by 1978, that
JOA had disintegrated into a $16.5 million mismanagement lawsuit
by the News against the Times.40 The two newspapers ultimately
agreed to an out-of-court settlement in which the JOA was termi-
nated, with the financially troubled News receiving $750,000 and its
independence from the Times.41 Since the demise of the Anchorage
JOA, the weaker newspapers in the JOAs in Columbus, Miami, and
St. Louis have each collapsed, thereby effectively severing those
JOAs.42 "[E]xperts predict that another six or eightJOA papers may
be killed within the next 15 years as agreements near expiration and
Vice President and the Press Kept Dark: Spiro Agnew's Candles, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 17,
1970, at 13, 14 (noting "the lack of any indication that such extreme measures as
price fixing or profit pooling are in fact necessary to permit the independent
existence of today's newspapers," (quoting Richard McLaren, Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust)), reprinted in 116 CONG. REC. 2014-15 (1970).
38 See 116 CONG. REc. 2010 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hart).
39 See Note, supra note 12, at 399 (stating that since the proponents of the NPA
did not demonstrate that a substantial number of newspapers would fail without the
exemption, the congressional conclusion that the antitrust exemption present in the
NPA is necessary for the preservation of competing and independent news sources is
unwarranted).
40 See Anchorage Dailies to End Joint Agreement in April, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Oct. 7,
1978, at 7.
41 See id. The News' dire economic straits were attributed partially to factors
unique to the Alaska market. See, e.g., Hein, Preservation Law Fails to Help Anchorage
News, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Nov. 6, 1976, at 7 (discussing the possibility that the
extremely cold Alaskan mornings make it more difficult for a morning newspaper,
such as the News, to enjoy financial success). The failure of the Anchorage JOA
nevertheless demonstrates that a JOA does not guarantee financial success.
42 When the agreement for joint operations between the Columbus Citizen-
Journal and Columbus Dispatch expired in 1985, the Citizen-Journal was closed
because the operation was unprofitable despite the act. Operation of the St.
Louis Globe-Democrat became unprofitable despite its agreement with the
Post-Dispatch and Newhouse Newspapers decided to close it. Another firm
purchased the Globe-Democrat but it soon went into bankruptcy and the paper
died in 1986. The Miami News ceased publication in December of last year
after renegotiating its agreement with its JOA partner, the Herald. Under
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as the dominant JOA publishers decide that a one-newspaper
monopoly is even more profitable than a two-newspaper
monopoly."
4 3
Proponents of the NPA too readily discarded alternative solu-
tions and overlooked the potential for favorable results in agree-
ments that did not contain antitrust exemptions. Although JOAs
were hailed as less monopolistic than complete mergers of two news-
papers under one owner, their advocates failed to realize that there is
greater room for entry into a market dominated by the latter.44 Fur-
thermore, no qualitative proof established that JOAs produce
greater editorial diversity than newspapers published under common
ownership.45 By allowing natural market forces to govern the news-
paper industry, Congress would have maximized access to the daily
newspaper market and more effectively accomplished its avowed
goal of preserving "diverse and antagonistic" sources.4 6
B. Failure To Enhance News and Editorial Coverage
The NPA presumed that financially strong newspapers would be
less concerned with pandering to the public and more willing to take
"courageous and unpopular" positions on current issues.47 Both the
quality and diversity of news and editorial coverage were expected to
improve with passage of the Act. Results have failed to measure up
the new agreement, the News' owner, Cox Newspapers, will receive as much
as $300 million from Knight-Ridder for closing the paper.
Oversight Hearing on the Operations of the Newspaper Preservation Act Exemption from the Anti-
trust Laws Before the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter NPA Oversight Hearing] (statement
of Robert G. Picard, Ph.D., at 2) (separately paginated by commentators' statements).
43 NPA Oversight Hearing, supra note 42 (statement of Bruce B. Brugmann, editor
and publisher of the San Francisco Bay Guardian and president of the Association of
Alternative Newsweeklies, at 2).
44 See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
45 See 116 CONG. REC. 23,152 (1970) (statement of Rep. Dennis) (claiming that
two newspapers published under common ownership may maintain "vigorous
conflicting editorial policies," and indicating that "the joint newspaper operating
agreement is not essential to the maintenance of a separate or an independent
editorial voice").
46 University of California-Berkeley School of Law Professor Stephen R. Barnett
argued, even before the enactment of the NPA, that the absence ofJOAs would cause
some newspapers to fail. Barnett reportedly claimed, however, that those papers
then would be replaced by other newspapers, "nurturing a more robust, more truly
independent, editorial climate." Doll, Antitrust Law Meets The Press, NAT'L LJ., Oct.
15, 1984, at 1, 26 (paraphrasing Barnett).
47 See Note, supra note 12, at 406 & n.76 (quoting S. REP. No. 535, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 3-4 (1969)).
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to expectations, however, and no positive correlation-has been estab-
lished betweenJOAs and improved diversity or quality of editorial or
news coverage.48
1. Failure To Achieve Editorial Diversity
Legislators first expressed doubts about the accuracy of the
NPA's premise during the congressional debates.4" The bill's oppo-
nents claimed that cooperation did not enhance editorial quality or
diversity but rather obstructed the achievement of those goals.50
The bill's proponents failed to counter these claims with definitive
proof of benefits arising from JOAs.51  Studies undertaken since
the NPA's enactment have verified the initial fears. One study con-
cluded that papers joined under aJOA generally do not provide two
discrete community voices,52 while another study found that "the
content of these papers seems slightly more similar to the content in
competitive papers than in noncompetitive ones."
53
48 See Lively, New Media, Old Dogma, 30 ARIz. L. REv. 257, 265 (1988) (claiming
that "assumptions that first amendment values are promoted by cooperation rather
than competition have not been proved to be entirely correct").
49 See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 2008 (1970) (statement of Sen. Percy) ("I am not
sure that the [NPA] ... will... strengthen an independent editorial voice that would
otherwise be stilled.").
50 See, e.g., id. at 23,150 (statement of Rep. MacGregor) ("[T]he sheltered
environment of a carefully divided market is a poor spur to editorial ingenuity and
[sic] creativity." (quoting Preserving Press Diversity, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1970, at 30,
col. 2)); see also id. at 23,157 (statement of Rep. Mikva) ("Newspaper combinations
involving such close community of economic interest as price-fixing and profit
pooling have resulted largely in less diversity of news coverage and muted
expressions of ideological differences ...." (quoting AFL-CIO Resolution on the
Newspaper Antitrust Exemption)). During the debates, Representative Kastenmeier
produced a letter from the AFL-CIO expressing that organization's doubts "that the
exemption is without danger to independence of news coverage and ideological
viewpoint, as the sponsors of the legislation contend." Id. at 23,175 (statement of
Rep. Kastenmeier) (quoting letter from AndrewJ. Biemiller, Director of Department
of Legislation, AFL-CIO).
51 See id. at 2012 (statement of Sen. Perry) ("[N]o formal study was undertaken
or presented to prove or disprove the contention that news and editorial operations
in [JOAs] are in fact any better for the public than they would be under one
ownership . . . . News and editorial matters are inextricably intertwined with
economic matters, but the questioning of witnesses has been aimed only at the
latter." (quoting Rowse, The 'Failing' Newspaper Probe: The Press Dummies Up, 208
NATION 816 (1969)).
52 See Ardoin, A Comparison of Newspapers Under Joint Printing Contracts, 50
JOURNALISM Q. 340, 347 (1973).
53 Id. at 345. But see H. LEVIN, BROADCAST REGULATION ANDJOINT OWNERSHIP OF
MEDIA 83 & n.20 (1960) (citing numerous studies indicating that "the actual contents
of newspapers operating independently in the same community.., apparently show
little difference in the handling of important social, political, and other problems").
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The failure of JOAs to achieve true editorial diversity is largely
attributable to inherent pragmatic difficulties. The very nature of a
JOA necessitates a close business relationship between the member
papers that can easily influence editorial and news content.54 Fur-
thermore, both newspapers, in pooling their advertising rates, cater
to the same market of prospective advertisers and are subject to the
same management biases to avoid controversial topics that could
potentially endanger these economically valuable relationships.
55
Although little empirical evidence exists quantifying the effec-
tiveness or ineffectiveness ofJOAs, two examples illustrate the con-
trast in diversity between markets that enjoy free competition and
markets dominated by JOAs. The potential for editorial collusion
was demonstrated by the two papers operating under the San Fran-
cisco JOA: the Chronicle and the Examiner. The Examiner's coverage
of the Chronicle's struggle to renew its broadcast license and of the
FCC's decision to deny that license was "delayed and minimal,"
implying that editorial independence may be compromised on any
issue in which either JOA member possesses a vested interest.
5 6
Conversely, the increased quality generated by direct competi-
tion is evidenced in the struggle between the four independent daily
New York newspapers:
[T]he... clear winner is the New York newspaper-reading public.
By importing its tradition of top-flight local and investigative
reporting, New York Newsday has forced the other papers, includ-
ing the Times, to compete on a higher level, and new columnists
introduced by the three tabloids consistently turn out first-rate
work.
57
The criteria used in one study ofJOAs are discussed infra text accompanying note
132.
54 See Note, supra note 32, at 691-92.
55 See Media and the First Amendment, supra note 14, at 897; cf H. LEVIN, supra note
53, at 84 (attributing the lack of significant difference in the content of two
independent newspapers in the same city to "the fact that two publishers are both
businessmen," which "may overshadow their differences as individuals").
56 See Note, supra note 12, at 410. The NPA's opponents also feared that JOAs
would provide incentives for publishers to conspire to take turns advocating
unpopular stances or to moderate opposing stances. See, e.g., 116 CoNG. REC. 23,143
(1970) (statement of Rep. Thompson) ("If there is a so-called separate editorial
policy, then one may well believe that the managers of the two newspapers get
together and one decides, 'Well, now, which side are you going to take? Which side
am I going to take? Let us not be too extreme on this. Let us kind of work
together.' ").
57 Zuckerman, The Last Stand of the Tabloids, TIME, Mar. 13, 1989, at 81.
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2. Failure To Improve Quality Of News Coverage
In addition to compromising the independence of editorial cov-
erage, the lack of direct competition between newspapers under
JOAs stifles the caliber of news coverage. Robert Picard, head of a
three-year Louisiana State University project focusing on press con-
centration, discerned a strong positive correlation between competi-
tion and quality of coverage. According to Picard, quality declines
drastically under JOAs: "The journalism suffers. There are excep-
tions, but in general if there is no direct head-to-head competition,
no incentives, it depends on the pride of the organization. If you
don't have that pride, you get cutbacks in news services, cutbacks in
locally produced copy, staff reductions.""8 This analysis of JOAs
contrasts sharply with the situation in New York, where steep compe-
tition has forced all three tabloids to improve the quality of their
news coverage.
59
C. Effects of Unanticipated "Competition"
At the time of the NPA's enactment, the newspaper industry did
not face today's wealth of competition from radio and television.
6 0
The NPA's proponents nonetheless erred in failing to view the news-
paper industry in the context of the vast multi-media spectrum and
in refusing to recognize the competition arising from "the plethora
and cacophony of voices" that characterizes the national media.
61
Derick Daniels, executive editor of the Detroit Free Press in 1970,
noted the far-reaching impact of the broadcast media industry's
growth: "In this decade, newspapers will not compete simply with
each other - or simply with TV, or movies, or magazines. No, they
will have to compete simultaneously with the whole multi-media
extravaganza of light and sound and type and motion in a war for the
individual's time."
6 2
58 Randolph & Behr, Newspaper Preservation Law Produces Windfalls, Wash. Post,
July 13, 1986, at All, col. 5 (quoting Picard). Opponents of the pending Detroit
JOA have expressed similar concerns, fearing that "the lack of competition will sap
some of the fire from the city's two big papers, leaving Detroit poorer." Id.
59 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
60 See, e.g., Thomas, Pie in the Sky: Newspapers Sell at Record Highs on Main Street and
Wall Street, BARRONS, Nov. 17, 1969, at 3, 18 (stating that in 1969, "the newspaper has
little advertising competition from the local airwaves"), reprinted in 116 CONG. REC.
2011 (1970); see also supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
61 See Lively, supra note 48, at 266 ("The NPA, in seeking to perpetuate an
industry based upon dated imagery, disregards the broader media galaxy in which
newspapers exist.").
62 Daniels, The World of Multi-Media: The Kingdom Is Run by Readers; Power Is Being
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The NPA has also proven unresponsive to internal develop-
ments within the newspaper industry, specifically the emergence of
competition from national and suburban newspapers. 6 3  The
national desk of a city newspaper competes against not only its
intracity rival but also the national desks of other major city newspa-
pers and national newspapers such as USA Today and The Wall Street
Journal. Similarly, "metropolitan" staffs of major city newspapers
face competition in "breaking" local stories from suburban newspa-
pers. 64 These structural changes within the newspaper industry have
been heralded as "improv[ing] the quality and extent of coverage"
'65
and have generated the competition that the NPA sought to
preserve.
The NPA's inflexibility has rendered it obsolete in an era charac-
terized by the development of new media sources. This inflexibility
has further inhibited first amendment freedoms by imposing artificial
restraints upon the marketplace of ideas.6 6 In failing to anticipate
the competition that would inevitably arise from technological
advances, the NPA has imposed rigid and enduring confines that
frustrate its avowed purpose.
D. Undesired Results of the NPA
1. Increased Influence of Newspaper Chains
Despite the lack of proof that the newspaper industry had estab-
lished a compelling need for exemption from the antitrust laws, the
NPA easily passed both the House and the Senate and received
almost immediate presidential approval. 67 The bill's breezy path
Believed; And Glory Comes After the Midnight Movie, QuILL, July 1970, at 8, 11, cited in
Loevinger, Media Concentration: Myth and Reality, ANInTRUST BuLL. Fall 1979, at 479,
492 n.36.
63 See Lively, supra note 48, at 265-66.
64 An analogous situation exists in Florida, where the size and shape of the state
stimulate fierce competition among newspapers in different cities because "nobody is
very far away from somebody else." Henry, The Best Papers Under the Sun: In Florida,
Competition Breeds Quality, Not Cheap Sensation, TIME, Apr. 26, 1982, at 66 (quoting
Orlando Sentinel Star Editor David Burgin). Between 1962 and 1982, Florida
newspapers won more Pulitzer Prizes (eight) than did the newspapers of any other
state; according to Miami Herald Executive Editor John McMullan, the incentive for
quality is high because "[i]f you don't put out a good newspaper in Florida,
somebody else will." Id.
65 Lively, supra note 48, at 266.
66 Cf id. at 267 ("Pursuit of first amendment goals by official enactments that do
not factor in the possibility of or adapt readily to changed circumstances is itself a
dangerous exercise.").
67 The NPA was passed by the Senate on January 30, 1970, by a vote of 64-13.
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through Congress suggests that its enactment was less attributable to
its merits than to "some of the most intensive lobbying ever seen on
Capitol Hill" by newspaper editors, publishers, and even report-
ers. 6 8  Because of the American press' powerful influence over
electoral politics, legislators seeking reelection were particularly vul-
nerable to the pressure of media lobbying groups.69 Congressmen
who opposed the NPA warned against allowing self-interest to moti-
vate the passage of otherwise unwarranted legislation. As one con-
gressman noted: "In the absence of a compelling showing of the
threat of failure, this House should be most skeptical of inferring
that the danger of newspaper failure is the real motive behind this
bill.',
70
The lobbying efforts of the press extended beyond Congress to
President Richard Nixon. In a letter to Nixon, Hearst Corporation
president and chief executive officer Richard W. Berlin described the
NPA as "a matter of common interest to both you and me." 7 1 Ber-
lin's implications were spelled out still more clearly in a letter to
Richard W. McLaren, Nixon's assistant attorney general in charge of
antitrust: "[T]here was almost unanimous support of the Adminis-
tration by the newspapers who are proponents of the Newspaper
Preservation Act. It therefore seems to me that those newspapers
See 116 CONG. REC. 2017 (1970). The House vote, onJuly 8, 1970, was 292-87. See
id. at 23,179. The bill was signed into law on July 24, 1970. See 15 U.S.C. § 1801
(1982).
68 116 CONG. REC. 2013 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hart) (quoting Rowse, supra
note 51, at 818).
69 See id. at 2012 (statement of Sen. Hart) ("The pressure that has pushed [the
NPA] ahead of countless more important measures in the past few months is silent
tribute to the power of the big publishers to get almost anything they want from
publicity-hungry politicians." (quoting Rowse, supra note 51, at 816)).
The power of the forces lobbying for congressional support may be inferred
from the nature of the NPA's staunchest supporters: the American Newspaper
Publishers Association and the chains of Scripps-Howard, Hearst, Newhouse, Knight,
Block, and Cox, each of which had at least one member paper involved in a JOA
during the lobbying period for the NPA. See id.
70 116 CONG. REC. 23,157 (1970) (statement of Rep. Mikva); see also id. at 2009
(statement of Sen. Hart) ("[A]II the [NPA] will preserve are the monopoly profits' of a
small group of publishers who have achieved those profits by price fixing, profit
pooling, and market division."); id. at 23,149 (statement of Rep. MacGregor) ("If
[preserving editorial diversity and competition in ideas] were the actual raison d'etre
for the bill, no fault could be found with it. But this rationale is a thin facade which is
not supported by the content of our hearings and which cannot stand searching
analysis.").
71 B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 1, at 96 (quoting letter from Richard W. Berlin to
President Richard M. Nixon (undated)).
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should, at the very least, receive a most friendly consideration.
7 2
Several weeks later, the Nixon Administration reversed its earlier
opposition to the bill,73 and President Nixon signed the NPA into
law in July.74 In the 1972 election, despite his administration's well-
known attacks upon other first amendment rights, 75 Nixon received
the highest percentage of newspaper endorsements of any candidate
in modem American history.76
Powerful pressure to enact the NPA was exerted by media chains
such as Hearst. 77 Significantly, the House report on the bill noted
that fifteen of the twenty-two pre-existingJOAs involved members of
national newspaper chains. 7' The chains successfully wielded their
influence over politicians through their substantial control over
national editorial content 79 and ensured that they would retain their
concentration of industry power.
72 Id. at 97 (quoting letter from Richard W. Berlin to Richard W. McLuren
(undated)).
73 See id. at 98.
74 See supra note 67. Ironically, from a survey of 20 newspapers with pre-
existingJOAs, only 13 carried stories mentioning the NPA's passage in the week after
it passed the Senate. Only five of these newspapers listed the 22 cities affected, and
only two, the Nashville Tennessean and the Salt Lake City Deseret News, admitted that
they specifically benefitted from the legislation. See A. BALK & J. BOYLAN, OUR
TROUBLED PRESS 262 (1971).
75 See, e.g., B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 1, at 99 ("For four years the Nixon
administration had attacked not only the news media but their constitutional rights.
Nixon had sent his vice-president on a crusade attacking newspapers that criticized
the White House or ran news of negative events that were normal fare in ordinary
reportage. In the Pentagon Papers case the Nixon administration obtained the first
court-ordered cessation of publication in the country's history.").
76 See id. Although Bagdikian's analysis suggests that Nixon's generous attitude
towards the NPA was motivated by desire for favorable press treatment in the
impending election, "[slome believe that Nixon saw the [NPA] not as a way to gain
favor, but as his final revenge on the press. He couldn't control the media, so the Act
would encourage his arch-enemies to devour themselves." NPA Oversight Hearing,
supra note 42 (statement of W. Edward Wendover, Editor and Publisher, The
Community Crier, Plymouth-Canton, Michigan, at 3).
77 See B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note I, at 95; see also 116 CONG. REC. 2009 (1970)
(statement of Sen. Hart) (noting that the characterization of the NPA as "a
millionaire-crybabies-publishers' bill" was "not an inappropriate label").
78 See H.R. REP. No. 1193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3547, 3549-50.
79 Studies have established that chains exert significant political pressure over
their subsidiaries' editorial content. See B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 1, at 84. The Cox
and Scripps-Howard chains require all of their papers to endorse the same national
candidates, and Scripps-Howard annually adopts a uniform stand on major issues.
See id. A Journalism Quarterly study published in 1975 noted that "the vast majority of
chains exhibited homogeneous endorsement patterns in the four presidential
election years studied [1960, 1964, 1968, 1972]." Chain Newspaper Autonomy as
Reflected in Presidential Campaign Endorsements, 52 JOURNALISM Q. 411, 419 (1975).
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The chains' influence dictated the NPA's definition of "failing
newspaper" as "a newspaper publication which, regardless of its owner-
ship or affiliations, is in probable danger of financial failure."80 This
provision, which allows a chain to participate as the owner of either
the stronger or the weaker paper, was intended as "an order to view
the newspaper as 'a free-standing entity, as if it were not owned by a
corporate parent.' "81 Because it allows chains to expand their
already substantial power, this definition permits the preservation of
JOAs at the expense, rather than the enhancement, of editorial
diversity.
8 2
The Act's requirement that JOAs be evaluated without respect
to ownership further ignores the potential for chains to exploit their
widespread power through predation. "Predatory cross-subsidiza-
tion" allows a company to charge high prices in markets with com-
paratively low competition and to use those profits to subsidize lower
prices in more competitive markets, thereby achieving monopoly or
near-monopoly status in all markets. 83 In the pending battle
between the Detroit Free Press and The Detroit News, both Knight-Rid-
der and Gannett have been charged with financing their continued
losses through the monopoly profits of other newspapers in the
chains.
84
The statutory definition also disregards the inherent advantages
chain owners enjoy under the NPA. A publisher may foist a substan-
tial amount of unnecessary or unwanted services on its subsidiaries
80 15 U.S.C. § 1802(5) (1982) (emphasis added).
81 Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Attorney Gen., 695 F. Supp. 1216,
1220 (D.D.C. 1988) (quoting Committee for an Indep. P-I v. Hearst Corp., 704 F,2d
467, 486, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983)), aff'd sub nom. Michigan Citizens for an
Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1952
(1989). Later applications of the NPA have posited little doubt that "[tihe legislative
history and language... [were] intended to permit chain-owned newspapers to apply
for the Act's exemption." Note, supra note 32, at 678.
82 See Note, supra note 32, at 696. "Congress narrowed in on preserving
editorial competition between forty-four joint operating newspapers while ignoring
the larger problem of preserving or encouraging nationwide diversity." Id.
The expansive definition of failing newspapers encourages chains to conspire to
force one newspaper within the statutory definition. When this occurs, both
newspapers may engage in otherwise illegal monopolistic practices that completely
bar new market entrants. See infra notes 91-106 and accompanying text; cf
Glassman, Paper Chase; The Money Culture, NEw REPUBLIC, June 23, 1988, at 11
(alleging that Gannett's CEO, Alan Neuharth, used profits from smaller papers in the
Gannett chain to finance the purchases of larger newspapers).
83 See Busterna, NewspaperJOAs and the Logic of Predation, COMM. & L., Apr. 1988,
at 3, 5 & n.7.
84 See id. at 14 & n.34.
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in order to facilitate those newspapers' abilities to show the "losses"
necessary to qualify for a JOA. 5 The NPA's failure to account for
ownership permits chains to manipulate the statutory language to
maintain their superior market positions; 8 6 such a result contradicts
the legislative intent that JOAs be established only as last resorts.
87
The vague nature of the statutory definition also effectively
thwarts the alleged impetus behind the NPA: the preservation of
"diverse and antagonistic" sources.8" The chains' financial strength
provides significant advantages in combatting the financial pressures
of the newspaper industry, ensuring their continued domination of
that field. Because most newspapers in a given chain generally
endorse the same political candidate8 9 and are similarly unreceptive
to minority viewpoints, the NPA effectively reduces the number of
voices in the marketplace of ideas.90 In doing so, the NPA creates a
result that directly contradicts its avowed goal.
85 See Note, supra note 32, at 687 & n.130. A more realistic evaluation is
provided by a "net benefit analysis" of what the chain truly derives from the paper,
encompassing such factors as tax benefits accruing from losses and the purchase of
services from the parent company. See id. at 687.
86 The Antitrust Division based its rejection of the Hearst Corporation's
application for aJOA in part on the grounds that the Hearst newspapers received a
net financial benefit from the loss; however, the ALJ and the Attorney General
refused to apply net benefit analysis claiming that it violated the statutory definition
of "failure" under the NPA. See id. at 687-88.
Similarly, in the controversy over the Detroit JOA, the ALJ predicted that the
Free Press would "not enter the downward spiral so long as Knight-Ridder remains in
Detroit." Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1295
n.12 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1952 (1989). The District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, however, dismissed this view as improperly relying on "the notion of a
'deep pocket' supporting the paper, which is an impermissible consideration under
the NPA." Id.
87 See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 23,148 (1970) (statement of Rep. McCulloch)
(asserting that antitrust exemptions for JOAs "should be limited only to those
situations where a joint newspaper operating arrangement is demonstrably essential
to prevent a newspaper failure"). This sentiment is particularly relevant when
applied to chains. See Note, supra note 32, at 689 ("Ifa chain owner's efficiencies and
economies of scale allow it to operate a newspaper without an actual net financial
loss, the alternative of a UOA] should not be available.").
88 See supra notes 2 & 3 and accompanying text.
89 See supra note 79.
90 See Note, supra note 32, at 695-96 & nn.184-87 ("The increasing
concentration in the newspaper industry thus decreases the diversity of voices in the
marketplace, and a select group has increasing influence over the news and ideas that
reach the public through their newspapers."); see also B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 1, at
84 ("Editorial vigor diminishes under chain ownership."); cf. Shenefield, supra note
32, at 1334 ("[P]reserving a large number of independent voices . . . is especially
important because the concentration of newspaper ownership limits the diversity of
opinion expressed in newspapers and diminishes the opportunity for First
Amendment expression . . . . "); Media and the First Amendment, supra note 14, at 898
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2. Incentives for Predation
The NPA encourages publishers to reap the financial benefits of
a JOA by providing loopholes through which newspapers strive to
attain failure. Substantial financial rewards motivate competitive
newspapers to engage in predatory pricing,91 in which one newspa-
per deliberately lowers prices beneath costs92 in an attempt to drive
("Control of the press, whether by government or by private entrepreneurs, conflicts
with the public interest in receiving information and ideas.").
91 See supra note 21 for an explanation of the financial rewards characteristic of
JOAs. Although these benefits also could be accrued under an internal monopoly,
one chain cannot drive a newspaper owned by another-chain outof business because
both can support their losses with profits earned by monopoly papers elsewhere in
the chain. See supra text accompanying note 83.
92 A newspaper's total economic costs include "fixed costs," usually consisting
of plant, equipment, and machinery, which do not vary with changes in output, and
"variable costs," such as materials, fuel, and direct and indirect labor, which
correspond to changes in output. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 21, § 712,
at 154-55. Because of the substantial initial investment in plant and machinery, the
newspaper industry "is characterized by very high fixed costs and [comparatively]
very low variable costs, which create significant production economies of scale."
Busterna, supra note 83, at 6. The increase in the total costs caused by producing an
additional unit of output is the "marginal cost." See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 21, § 712, at 155. A business may be held to have engaged in predatory pricing
if it sets prices below either marginal costs, see id. at 168, or average variable costs, see
id. at 174. See also infra note 93 for further discussion of what constitutes predatory
pricing.
The newspaper industry is also unique in that revenue is obtained through both
newspaper sales and advertising. Lowering prices beneath costs could consequently
refer either to the price of advertisements or to the price of the newspaper. Both
tactics appear to have been employed in the Detroit price war, which has been
characterized by "low advertising rates and ... an extraordinarily low copy price."
Busterna, supra note 83, at 16. However, because "[i]t is a well established fact that
the life blood of the newspaper business is its advertising revenue," City & County of
Honolulu v. Hawaii Newspaper Agency, 559 F. Supp. 1021, 1,030 (D. Haw. 1983), a
newspaper may achieve a greater predatory impact by concentrating its attention on
advertising rates.
Newspapers that have a substantial circulation advantage reap the benefits of the
special relationship between circulation and advertising rates:
Rates are normally quoted in terms of the cost to reach one million
readers with a single line of advertising copy - the "milline" rate. This
practice means that, where two papers charge the same amount per line,
the paper with the larger circulation can quote a lower milline rate. When
one paper has a circulation dramatically larger than its competitors', it is
able to charge more per line, yet still quote a higher milline rate. Because
businessmen want the most for their advertising dollar, the smaller paper
is at a distinct competitive disadvantage.
Media and the First Amendment, supra note 14, at 894 (citing Roberts, Antitrust Problems in
the Newspaper Industry, 82 HARV. L. REV. 319, 324 (1968)). Although the smaller paper
could attempt to match the larger paper's circulation by lowering its advertising
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a rival out of business.9 3 That competitor willingly tolerates short-
term losses in anticipation of the profits generated by a long-term
monopoly.94 Because of the substantial lag before the realization of
profits, predation occurs only in unusually conducive circum-
stances:9 5 the antitrust exemption permitted under the NPA has
been cited as "the necessary ingredient that can make predation
successful."9 6
Under the NPA, the goal of predatory pricing is not to drive the
competitor out from the market but rather to drive that competitor
rates, it would encounter difficulties in absorbing the temporary losses necessary to
achieve an equalization of the milline rate. See id. at 895-96.
93 See Busterna, supra note 83, at 4. There is presently no consensus on the
proper definition of predatory pricing in the antitrust context. See Cargill, Inc. v.
Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484, 493 n.12 (1986). The Supreme Court, in
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574 (1986), indicated that
predatory pricing would be found upon a showing of a conspiracy to drive the
alleged victim out of the relevant market by "(i) pricing below the level necessary to
sell their products, or (ii) pricing below some appropriate measure of costs." Id. at
585 n.8. There is a wide split among circuit courts as to what constitutes an
"appropriate measure;" some have held that predation may be presumed only upon
a showing of pricing below marginal or average variable costs, see Arthur S.
Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1056 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1036 (1984), while others have claimed that even pricing above average
total costs may constitute predation if predatory intent is proven. See Transamerica
Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955
(1983).
The Matsushita Court also stated that because of the time delay and heavy losses
inherent in driving a competitor out of the market, predatory pricing is impractical
and rarely employed. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589. This argument does not
encompass.competitive newspapers: the amount of time needed to convince a paper
to conspire to meet the standard of failure necessary for a JOA is significantly less
than that needed to make the other newspaper close permanently.
94 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588. The Matsushita Court stated that because it is
unlikely that a predator will accrue and maintain monopoly power over an extended
period of time, "there is a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful." Id. at 589 (citations
omitted). The Court noted, however, that a predatory scheme's chances of success
are greatest when there is a high barrier to entry that enables the predator "to
maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended time." Id. at 591 n.15. Because
the newspaper industry is characterized by heavy costs and high financial barriers to
entry, see supra text accompanying notes 13-14, the reasoning in Matsushita is
inapplicable to JOAs.
95 See Busterna, supra note 83, at 5.
96 Id. at 9; cf Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Attorney Gen., 695 F.
Supp. 1216, 1221 (D.D.C. 1988) ("[W]henever government offers a benefit because
of financial hardship-be it welfare applicant or failing newspaper-there is always an
incentive for the potential recipient to either exaggerate or exacerbate its woes in
order to receive the benefit."), aff'd sub nom. Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v.
Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1952 (1989).
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into a JOA."7 As such, the NPA provides incentive for publishers to
conspire with each other and pursue strategies to bring one of their
newspapers under the statutory umbrella of "failure." 98 Despite the
NPA's guarantee that "[n]othing contained in the chapter shall be
construed to exempt from any antitrust law any predatory pricing
[or] any predatory practice,"99 significant evidence establishes that
such tactics have in fact been employed. The facts and circumstances
surrounding the recent Detroit JOA, for example, indicate that the
publishers in that city engaged in a "conspiracy of cooperation"
prior to the agreement.1 "0
Detroit is presently the only metropolitan area outside of New
York with two independent general-interest daily newspapers, each
of whose circulation surpasses 650,000.01 The competitors-the
Detroit Free Press and The Detroit News-were immersed in a cutthroat
price and wage war for more than twenty years preceding the
JOA.1 2 Detroit citizens and advertisers consequently enjoyed the
least expensive major dailies and the highest per capita newspaper
readership rate of any major metropolitan area in the nation." 3
Gannett acquired the News in 1985; shortly thereafter it entered
into discussions with Alvah H. Chapman, Jr., chairman of Knight-
Ridder (which owned the Free Press), about the possibility of a
97 See Busterna, supra note 83, at 13.
98 Such a conspiracy is prohibited by § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982), which declares illegal "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce .... "
A newspaper may meet the statutory definition of failure long before its demise
becomes inevitable. A conspiracy to meet the statutory definition of failure is
particularly effective when the proposed JOA is between newspapers owned by
chains. A chain acting as "predator" may use earnings from profitable newspapers
elsewhere within the chain to offset the losses sustained from its "predatory" tactics.
See supra text accompanying notes 83-84. If the victim newspaper is also a chain,
however, it may employ similar techniques and extend the predatory battle
indefinitely. The predation argument is therefore valid in either of the two following
scenarios: (1) a situation in which the predator is a member of a chain but the victim
is not, see Busterna, supra note 83, at 15, or (2) a conspiracy between two newspapers
which are either members of chains or otherwise able to sustain substantial losses
over extended periods of time. See supra text accompanying note 84.
99 15 U.S.C. § 1803(c) (1982).
100 Busterna, supra note 83, at 13.
101 See Michigan Citizens, 695 F. Supp. at 1217.
102 See id
103 See id. Shortly after the Attorney General's approval of the Detroit JOA,
Gannett announced its intent to cut prices in Little Rock, Arkansas, where it is
presently in competition with an independent newspaper. See NPA Oversight Hearing,
supra note 42 (statement of W. Edward Wendover, Editor and Publisher, The
Community Crier, Plymouth-Canton, Michigan, at 2).
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JOA.' 4 The ensuing relationship between the allegedly competing
newspapers was described by one unspecified Knight-Ridder spokes-
man as "brotherly." ' 5 This characterization illustrates two critical
flaws inherent in the NPA: failure to preserve true competition
between newspapers and incentive to engage in predation in order
to qualify for a JOA. 1
0 6
3. Incentives to Manipulate Financial Failure
The NPA requires only that one of the newspapers seeking to
enter a JOA be "in probable danger of financial failure." 10 7 This
standard is far less stringent than that espoused in Citizen Publishing
Co. v. United States,'s because it fails to specify what factors should
be considered in determining whether a newspaper's "failure" is suf-
ficiently imminent to warrant the drastic option of a JOA.'0 9 Pub-
lishers consistently have argued for the widest possible latitude in
interpreting the definition, and numerous JOAs have accordingly
received approval even though they were far from the "last resort"
envisioned by the NPA's proponents.
104 See Busterna, supra note 83, at 13. Knight-Ridder had apparently made
similar overtures to the prior owners of the News, without apparent success. See id. at
13-14.
105 See id. at 14. This "brotherly" relationship may have been inspired by the
potential profitability of a JOA: approval of the Detroit JOA would allow Knight-
Ridder and Gannett to split as much as $100 million in annual profits within six
years. See Justices to Hear Newspaper Case, Phila. Inquirer, May 2, 1989, at C2, col. 5.
106 While no concrete proof exists that the Detroit newspapers were pricing
below short-term costs within the meaning of "predatory," a "powerful
presumption" may be inferred from the facts that:
a. Both newspapers sustained heavy losses - $35 million for the Free
Press and $20 million for the News over five years - while increasing costs
and holding down circulation and advertising prices.
b. "[B]oth newspapers . . . slipped off the advertising rate card, a
practice not normally done with print advertising media."
c. Chain owners in both circumstances were able to sustain papers
through the use of profits from monopoly papers elsewhere in the chain.
See Busterna, supra note 83, at 14.
107 15 U.S.C. § 1802(5) (1982).
108 394 U.S. 131 (1969). Citizen Publishing required that the company be on the
verge of liquidation and that there be no prospective buyers other than its
competitor. See Media and the First Amendment, supra note 14, at 903; see also supra text
accompanying notes 23 & 24.
109 Factors that should generally be considered in determining if a company is
in danger of failure are: "the unhealthy conditions of the firm, the dangers these
conditions pose for the future, the feasibility of curative measures short of merger,
and the healthy aspects of the firm." Media and the First Amendment, supra note 14, at
901-02 (citing United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 187 (1969)).
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In Committee for an Independent P-I v. Hearst Corp., 110 the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court ruling and upheld the
Attorney General's approval of a JOA between Seattle's Times and
Post-Intelligencer. The court reached its decision despite evidence that
the Hearst Corporation, which owned the Post-Intelligencer, had
received and ignored seven purchase inquiries. 11 The court
acknowledged, however, that the presence of alternative buyers was
a valid factor to be considered in evaluating a newspaper's eligibility
for a JOA: "While we disagree with the district court's conclusion
that an attempt to sell the paper is necessary to prove no reasonable
alternatives to the JOA exist, we do agree that reasonable alterna-
tives to a JOA are relevant to our analysis."
' 12
The Hearst Corporation's failure to consider selling the paper
suggested that it deliberately sustained losses in order to qualify for
a JOA. Although the Hearst court expressed concern that newspa-
pers not deliberately "engage in poor business practices or maintain
inept personnel" solely to qualify for aJOA in the future 13 and rec-
ognized that "[t]he pertinence of interested purchasers . . . may
require a JOA applicant to prove that the 'new ownership and man-
agement could not convert the [paper] into a profitable enterprise
without resort to a joint operating arrangement,' " 14 it upheld the
approval of the Seattle JOA. The Court based its decision on find-
ings that the Post-Intelligencer was deeply immersed in a "downward
spiral" and that the JOA's proponents had sufficiently established
"that the paper was managed reasonably and its trend toward failure
[was] irreversible under any management." 1 5
In evaluating the proposedJOA in Detroit, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia employed a standard even more easily
satisfied than that of the "downward spiral." In Michigan Citizens for
an Independent Press v. Thornburgh, 11 6 the court upheld former Attor-
ney General Edwin Meese's grant of a JOA between the Detroit Free
Press and the The Detroit News, despite Meese's acceptance of the
ALJ's finding of fact that neither paper had entered a downward spi-
110 704 F.2d 467 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983).
111 See id. at 475 & n.5.
112 Id. at 476.
113 Id. at 478.
114 Id. (quoting Recommended Decision of Administrative LawJudge Moore on
the Application of the Cincinnati Enquirer and the E.W. Scripps Co., Dep't ofJustice
Docket No. 43-03-24-4, at 127 (1979)).
115 Id at 479.
116 868 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1952 (1989).
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ral." 7 By condoning a JOA in the absence of a showing of overrid-
ing need, the Michigan Citizens court effectively removed any
conceivable barriers to future JOAs.
The Michigan Citizens court disregarded the Hearst court's man-
date to consider the availability of reasonable alternatives before
sanctioning a JOA. Although no ready purchasers existed, the ALJ
discerned a "reasonable alternative": "Detroit could sustain two
profitable papers if the Free Press and the News both raised circula-
tion and advertising prices."' s When coupled with the substantial
evidence that the Free Press's losses were purposefully induced," 9
this indication of potential profitably establishes that a JOA was not
the only viable option.
The Michigan Citizens court applied extreme deference in review-
ing the Attorney General's decision and declared that it could over-
turn that decision only if it was clearly "arbitrary or capricious."' 2 °
The legislative history of the NPA, however, indicates that JOAs
were intended to serve only as final resorts; the Michigan Citizens
court's failure to recognize and sustain this intent has created an
"open door" through which "the few remaining competitive U.S.
papers [may] merge and reap monopoly profits at the expense of
subscribers and advertisers."'
' 2 '
On November 13, 1989, the Court upheld the proposed JOA in
Michigan Citizens by a four-to-four vote.' 22 Because a tie vote in the
Supreme Court serves only to resolve a specific dispute and does not
I7 Meese conceded that there were no "marketplace declines in overall
advertising and newspaper circulation in Detroit of the sort that traditionally propel a
junior newspaper into the proverbial 'downward spiral' that is fatal to survival." In re
Application by Detroit Free Press, Inc., and the Detroit News, Inc., for Approval of a
Joint Newspaper Operation Arrangement Pursuant to the Newspaper Preservation
Act, Op. Att'y Gen. No. 44-03-24-8, reprinted in 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 257, 258 (August 11, 1988).
118 Michigan Citizens, 868 F.2d at 1290.
119 See supra text accompanying note 84.
120 See Michigan Citizens, 868 F.2d at 1291 ("[T]here is no question in our mind
that if the Attorney General's statutory interpretation is reasonable, it is entitled to
deference .. ").
121 White & Wermiel, supra note 29, at B5, col. 6. TheJOA application recently
filed between two competing newspapers in York, Pennsylvania follows the lead of
the Detroit newspapers in asserting that a downward spiral is not a necessary
prerequisite for a JOA. See id.
122 See Greenhouse, Linkup of 2 Detroit Papers Upheld by Court in Tie Vote, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 14, 1989, at DI, col. 1. Justice Byron White did not participate in the
decision. See id.
JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENTS
establish a general precedent, the standard of approval for JOAs
remains open to interpretation.'
23
IV. VIOLATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT RI-Hrs
A. The Unconstitutionality of Enforcing the Conditions
Imposed by the NPA
1. The Inevitability of Governmental Interference
with Editorial Judgment
The NPA permits exemption from the antitrust laws on the con-
dition that "there is no merger, combination, or amalgamation of
editorial or reportorial staffs, and that editorial policies be independently
determined."124 Because no JOA has yet been challenged as violative
of this provision, the requirement of "editorial independence" has
not officially been defined. Furthermore, neither the NPA nor the
regulations promulgated under it specify means through which the
Department of Justice may enforce this provision.
125
The government's ability to enforce the NPA hinges upon the
interpretation of this provision. One potential definition of "inde-
pendence" as requiring only that no one person serve on the edito-
rial boards of both newspapers, does not necessitate investigation
into editorial judgment and may accordingly pass constitutional mus-
ter.' 26 An alternative definition requires that the papers act inde-
123 Cf id. at D20, col. 4. (noting that Michigan Citizens "had been expected to
produce some guidance about the standards [of failure required for granting
JOAs)").
124 15 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
125 See id.; 28 C.F.R. § 48.3 (1988).
126 In the course of ordinary business dealings, a showing that two discrete
organizations maintain separate personnel would likely give rise to the assumption
that those organizations operate independently. Because of first amendment
concerns, however, an assumption that automatically applies to general businesses
may not blindly be applied to newspapers. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer
Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138, 2146 (1988) (holding that although an ordinance
giving the mayor unbridled discretion over permits to soda vendors was
constitutional, an identical ordinance governing permits to newspaper publishers was
not); Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826, 834 (1st Cir. 1972) (holding unconstitutional
a city ordinance requiring street vendors selling certain articles, including
newspapers, to obtain permits because the objective of controlling traffic could be
achieved without restricting first amendment rights); Philadelphia News, Inc v.
Borough Council, 381 F. Supp. 228, 241 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("[N]ewspaper vending
boxes or machines along public streets and sidewalks are a constitutionally protected
means of distribution."); cf. infra note 138 (contrasting the government's strict stance
against regulations governing newspapers with its willingness to sanction regulations
governing broadcast media). This line of reasoning suggests that even the mere
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pendently in formulating editorial policy; enforcement of this
interpretation invites unconstitutional governmental inquiry into the
editorial process because of the inevitable comparison of the news-
papers' news and editorial content. The NPA's broad language and
clear legislative intent strongly support the latter interpretation.
The language of the proviso explicitly distinguishes the require-
ment of separate editorial and reportorial staffs from the require-
ment of independent determination of editorial policy.127
Enforcement of the entire provision would consequently transcend
mere comparison of the mastheads and additionally entail govern-
ment inquiry into editorial judgment and decision-making. 128 This
reading appears consistent with interpretations by the Attorney Gen-
eral and federal courts; the Seattle JOA has been interpreted as
requiring each newspaper to "retain control over its own editorial
policies and news content,- 1 29 while the Detroit JOA has been
described as providing "that the news and editorial staffs of the two
papers are to remain independent and insulated from influence by
the other party to the arrangement."' 130 The Government cannot
comparison of personnel, which may suffice for business purposes, would not satisfy
the level of independence required by the NPA.
127 See supra text accompanying note 124. An editorial staff is the board of
editors who oversee the news operations of a newspaper. Editorial policy is the
series of decisions made by the editorial staff. See generally J. HULTENG, THE OPINION
FUNCTION: EDITORIAL AND INTERPRETIVE WRITING FOR THE NEws MEDIA 25-39 (1973)
(describing the editorial staff and its role in the formulation of editorial policy). A
close reading of the statutory language clarifies the congressional intent underlying
the proviso. When Congress drafted the NPA, the word "independently" was not
used in conjunction with the requirement of discrete editorial and reportorial staffs,
but rather to describe the requirement of policy determination. If Congress had
intended the requirement to mean only independent editorial staffs, rather than both
independent staffs and independent policy determinations, then it would have used
the word "independently" only to modify "staffs" and would not have incorporated
it into the requirement governing editorial policies.
128 See Media and the First Amendment, supra note 14, at 902 ("The... important
requirement of editorial and reportorial autonomy is constitutionally limited to only
the most superficial enforcement. Although the agreement between the joining
papers and the physical integrity of each paper's editorial staff is a proper area of
investigation, any government[alI inquiry into editorial content itself is prohibited by
the first amendment. This limited scope of inquiry leaves the public interest virtually
unprotected."); see also Randolph & Behr, supra note 58, at All, col. 5 ("[T]he law
does not, and constitutionally could not, stipulate what kind of editorial voices
should be preserved under a JOA." (quoting newspaper analyst John Morton)).
129 Notice of application for approval of JOA filed to Attorney General by
Seattle Times and Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 46 Fed. Reg. 22,996 (1981).
130 Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1289
(D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1952 (1989). The proposition of insulated
editorial and reportorial staffs is analogous to the concept of "Chinese walls"
commonly employed by investment banking firms. A "Chinese wall" isolates a firm's
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determine the independence of editorial policymaking and, in partic-
ular, the presence of undue influence prohibited by the DetroitJOA
without intruding into editorial judgment and abridging a newspa-
per's first amendment rights.
Even a seemingly objective comparison of the contents of the
two newspapers entails implied assumptions about the reporting
techniques and editorial decisions precipitating the selection and
ordering of stories, columns, and editorials, thereby effectively con-
stituting impermissible discovery into editorial judgment.'' The
three criteria employed in studies measuring the independence of
JOAs-news space allocation, editorial space allocation, and. money
spent on news and editorial expenses-all necessitate such unconsti-
tutional government entry into the editorial process."3 2 Similarly,
independent policies may not immediately be inferred upon a show-
ing of opposing editorial points of view: such a comparison not only
trading side from its investment banking side, with the intent of "prohibiting the
interdepartmental flow of information." Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d
398, 401, (2d Cir. 1974); see also Geisler v. Wyeth Lab., 716 F. Supp. 520, 526 (D.
Kan. 1989) (discussing the insulation function of a Chinese wall); MacMillano, Inc. v.
American Express Co., 125 F.R.D. 71, 74-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (describing the Chinese
wall policies of an investment banking firm); Koppers Co. v. American Express Co.,
689 F. Supp. 1413, 1416 & n.5 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (defining the basic function of
"Chinese walls" and listing SEC reports that refer to the concept).
131 Further enforcement complications arise when, as in the Detroit JOA, the
joining newspapers agree to publish only one paper on Saturday and Sunday, "with
each paper assuming separate editorial and news responsibilities" and separate
editorial pages. See Michigan Citizens, 868 F.2d at 1289. The newspapers operating
under the San Francisco JOA, the Chronicle and the Examiner, also "jointly publish a
unified Sunday edition," Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 344 F. Supp.
1155, 1157 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The determination of independent editorial operations
is substantially more difficult to enforce when only one newspaper is published by the
jointly operated companies; although the editorial operations are separate, the
selection and placement of news stories entail at least some cooperative decision
making. The inherent enforcement difficulties created in such an instance suggest
that aJOA that permits the two newspapers to publish one joint edition on a regular
basis may be beyond the scope of the NPA, in which Congress expressly sought to
preserve editorial diversity by ensuring the continued publication of two discrete
newspapers. AJOA that permits such ajoinder conceivably could be challenged on
purely statutory grounds as violating the NPA, without recourse to a constitutional
challenge against the Act as authorizing a violation of first amendment rights.
132 See Lacy, Content ofJoint Operation Newspapers, in PRESS CONCENTRATION AND
MONOPOLY: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON NEWSPAPER OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION 153
(1988). Because no JOA has ever been challenged on the grounds that the
newspapers involved were not sufficiently independent, it is impossible to surmise
definitively what criteria would be employed by a court or an administrative body in
deciding such a challenge. However, because these criteria are the three types of
allocation processes assumed by experts "to affect the content of newspapers," id.,
they arguably represent the most appropriate means of estimating independence.
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comprises an unconstitutional regulation of content" 3 but also over-
looks the potential for newspapers to collude and adopt deliberately
antagonistic positions.'
34
Such governmental inquiry into editorial judgment or policy
deliberations inherently violates the first amendment. In Miami Her-
ald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 13 1 the Supreme Court invalidated a Flor-
ida statute that required a newspaper to afford a right of reply to
candidates whose personal character had been attacked in its editori-
als. The Court acknowledged the legitimate need to protect editorial
diversity given the newspaper industry's increasingly monopolistic
tendencies'3 6 but subordinated that interest to the weightier and
more deeply-rooted constitutional protection against governmental
interference with editorial judgment.1 7 The Tornillo Court empha-
sized that the Constitution protected those specific activities that
would be subject to governmental scrutiny under the NPA:
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions
made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and
treatment of public issues and public officials - whether fair or
unfair - constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment.
It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this
crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.'
3 8
133 See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987)
(holding that a state sales tax scheme exempting certain publications, such as
newspapers and religious journals, but taxing other publications, such as general
interest magazines, was violative of the first amendment because the government
cannot impose a content-based discriminatory tax burden on the press); Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that a "right of
reply" statute was an unconstitutional regulation of the press' independent editorial
process, as well as a content-based penalty imposed on the press that is likely to
produce a chilling effect).
134 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
135 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
136 See id. at 248-54.
137 See id. at 258. The prohibition against governmental interference with
editorial judgment espoused in Tornillo clearly precludes any enforcement of the NPA
that entails comparison of the content of the two newspapers. The reasoning in
Tornillo additionally implies that the Constitution would prohibit the government
from enforcing any interpretation of the NPA that requires more than a mere
comparison of staffs. See id.
138 Id. The Court's strict construction of the first amendment as it applies to the
protection of newspapers from government interference is particularly noteworthy
when contrasted with the Court's willingness to apply the fairness doctrine to
safeguard editorial diversity of the broadcast media. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Court upheld an order of the Federal
Communications Commission requiring a radio station to provide equal response
time to any person attacked in a broadcast. The Red Lion Court indicated, however,
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The sanctity of the newsgathering and editorial processes is
deeply embedded in the Constitution and epitomizes the Framers'
ideal of a press sufficiently removed from governmental coercion to
check government power."3 9 Any potential for government inter-
vention into editorial operations inherently chills the complete free-
dom necessary for the press to effectuate this function: "[T]he threat
of sanctions may deter the . . . [exercise of first amendment free-
doms] almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions." 140
Concern that enforcement of the NPA would infringe upon freedom
of the press permeated the legislative debate over the Act: one repre-
sentative warned of the potential for "Government regulation of
newspapers, a loss of editorial independence, and a compromising of
the traditional independence of the American press [that] could do
irreparable damage to our political, economic, and social fabric."
141
2. The Unconstitutionality of Government Entry
into the Newsroom
The potential chill created by government "entry" into the
newsroom, even for motives unrelated to the suppression of speech,
has generally prompted governmental reluctance to "enter" the
that this doctrine did not extend to newspapers because the Court did not perceive
the press as a scarce resource warranting governmental regulation. The scarce
number of potential broadcast media sources made it "idle to posit an unabridgeable
First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to
speak, write, or publish." Id. at 388.
The Court has consistently invoked this "scarcity" rationale in differentiating
broadcast media from newspapers. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973) ("Unlike other media,
broadcasting is subject to an inherent physical limitation .. "); see also FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 (discussing a statute forbidding
editorializing by noncommercial educational stations receiving public grants and
noting that "[w]ere a similar ban on editorializing applied to newspapers and
magazines, we would not hesitate to strike it down as violative of the first
amendment"), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984); FCC v. National Citizens
Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 800 (1978) (holding that regulation of
broadcasting "may be permissible where similar efforts to regulate the print media
would not be").
139 See Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 534 (1983)
("As a means of checking government power ... the press was expected to be the
primary source of restraint.").
140 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1962). The lack of any official
definition or clearly identifiable criteria of editorial independence may magnify any
potential chill on the free press because there is no authoritative source to which
editors can turn as a safe harbor when threats of sanctions arise. See supra text
accompanying notes 124-25.
141 116 CONG. REC. 23,167 (1970) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
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newsroom for any reason. In implementing the Privacy Protection
Act of 1980 ("PPA"),' 42 Congress severely limited the government's
power to enter newsrooms when conducting searches and seizures
pursuant to a criminal investigation. The PPA prohibits all govern-
ment entry to search for or seize work product materials possessed
by newspaper persons, authors, or broadcasters, except when there
is probable cause to believe that the person possessing the materials
has committed or is committing a criminal offense involving the
materials or when there is reason to believe that immediate seizure
of the materials is essential to prevent death or serious bodily
injury. 143 Even if the government has reason to believe that the per-
son possessing the material has committed or will commit a crime,
however, government officials may not search for or seize work-
product materials if the alleged offense "consists of the receipt, pos-
session, communication, or withholding of such materials or the
information contained therein."
' 14 4
The PPA was passed less than three years after the Supreme
Court's decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily. 145 The Zurcher Court
held that the first amendment did not preclude searches and seizures
in newsrooms conducted pursuant to the "probable cause" require-
ment of the fourth amendment. 146 Although Zurcher has not been
expressly overruled, its holding was severely limited by the passage
of the PPA.14 7 The PPA appears instead to have followed Justice
Stewart's dissent in Zurcher, which warned that "unannounced police
142 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa to aa-12 (1982).
143 See id. at § 2000aa(a). Section 2000aa(b) discusses the more lenient
restrictions governing searches and seizures of non-work product material.
144 Id. at § 2000aa(a)(1).
145 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
146 See id. at 567 ("[W]e decline to reinterpret the [Fourth] Amendment to
impose a general constitutional barrier against warrants to search newspaper
premises .... ).
147 The PPA represents Congress' attempt to restrict the broad scope of Zurcher.
See Seek Help Immediately to Block Search, NEws MEDIA & L., Fall 1988, at 6. The Zurcher
decision represented judicial acknowledgment of the government's full constitutional
power to conduct searches pursuant to the fourth amendment. In enacting the PPA,
Congress sought to restrict that power to limited situations involving the probable
culpability of members of the press. By statutorily limiting the government's right to
conduct searches and seizures of the press, Congress granted greater protection than
the Constitution requires for the protection of the editorial process from
unwarranted governmental intrusion. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 874, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(stating that the purpose of the bill is "to limit governmental search and seizure of
documentary materials possessed by persons engaged in first amendment activities"),
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3950, 3950; id. at 3950-51 ("This
[bill] was prompted by Zurcher .... The committee believes that the search warrant
procedure in itself does not sufficiently protect the press and other innocent third
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searches of newspaper offices will significantly burden the constitu-
tionally protected function of the press to gather news and report it
to the public."'
48
The Supreme Court articulated these first amendment concerns
in advocating a blanket restriction on economic legislation that "sin-
gles out" newspapers for special treatment. In Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 149 the Court invali-
dated a special "use tax" on the cost of paper and ink products lev-
ied only on newspapers using more than $100,000 worth of those
products. The Court held that any differential treatment of the press
was presumptively unconstitutional because it implied motives
related to the suppression of speech and potentially chilled first
amendment freedoms: "[T]he very selection of the press for special
treatment threatens the press not only with the current differential
treatment, but also with the possibility of subsequent differentially
more burdensome treatment." 150
The broad scope of the holding in Minneapolis Star encompassed
all legislation "singling out" newspapers, regardless of that legisla-
tion's potential harmful or beneficial effect upon newspapers and
regardless of the presence or absence of censorial legislative
intent."' Minneapolis Star has not been overruled and remains good
parties . ); see also id at 3956 (noting the probable chilling effect on the press
from disruptive governmental searches of newspaper employees and offices).
148 Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 574 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart noted the
two most significant potential dangers of newsroom searches: physical disruption of
newspaper operations and the possibility of disclosure of information obtained from
confidential sources and the identity of those sources. See id. at 571 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Stewart warned that "[s]ince the indisputable effect of such searches will
thus be to prevent a newsman from being able to promise confidentiality to his
potential sources .... a journalist's access to information, and thus the public's, will
thereby be impaired." Id. at 572-73 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
149 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
150 Id. at 588. The Minneapolis Star Court intimated that the legislation in
question need not be burdensome and could even benefit newspapers: "[E]ven
without actually imposing an extra burden on the press, the government might be
able to achieve censorial effects ...." Id. Any legislation singling out the press for
differential treatment could be held presumptively unconstitutional because of its
potentially chilling effect on editorial independence. Differential treatment might
create a cautionary fear among the press that future burdensome state measures will
follow-a fear that can only interfere with the press' constitutional right to serve as
an unfettered and independent source of criticism and ideas. See Bezanson, Political
Agnosticism, Editorial Freedom, and Government Neutrality Toward the Press: Observations on
Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 72 IowA L.
REV. 1359, 1360 (1987).
151 Despite the factual similarity between the two cases, the Minneapolis Star
Court expressly did not rely on Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 579-80. In Grosean, the Court invalidated a Louisiana
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law; however, many subsequent decisions have adopted narrow
interpretations of the Court's holding, thereby limiting its initial
expansiveness. 152
The Supreme Court relied upon its decision in Minneapolis Star
in deciding Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland.'53 The Ragland
Court held unconstitutional a state sales tax scheme that taxed gen-
eral interest magazines but exempted newspapers and religious, pro-
fessional, trade, and sports journals. The Court noted, however, that
this selective scheme was even "more disturbing" than that in Minne-
apolis Star, "because the basis on which Arkansas differentiates
between magazines is particularly repugnant to First Amendment
principles: a magazine's tax status depends entirely on its content."' 54
The Ragland Court's emphasis on content suggests a possible
narrowing of Minneapolis Star's initial scope.' 55 The Ragland Court
emphasized that the statute in question employed a content-based
distinction and specified a select group of publications for differen-
tial treatment; its decision consequently appears more consistent
with the Court's second holding in Minneapolis Star that the use tax
"violates the First Amendment not only because it singles out the
press, but also because it targets a small group of newspapers.
' 156
license tax imposed on all state newspapers whose weekly circulation exceeded
20,000. See Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 240. The Grosjean Court held that because the
statute's legislative history indicated that the tax scheme was intended to punish a
select group of politically outspoken newspapers, it was unconstitutional as violative
of the first amendment. See id. at 250 ("[The tax] is bad because, in the light of its
history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in
the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled
in virtue of the constitutional guarantees.") The Minneapolis Star Court distinguished
Grosjean, noting that "[i]n the case currently before us . . . there is no legislative
history and no indication.., of any impermissible or censorial motive on the part of
the legislature." Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 580. The Minneapolis Star decision
consequently does not adopt the premise that proof of an impermissible legislative
purpose is a requirement for finding a tax scheme violative of the first amendment.
Rather, the decision relies upon the assumption that, although the state acted with
proper care and motivation and without manifest censorial intent, the resulting
legislation exceeded constitutional bounds because it authorized differential
treatment of the press and because such treatment is likely to chill the press' exercise
of its first amendment rights.
152 See, e.g., infra note 162 (discussing cases that interpret Minneapolis Star as
requiring a compelling state interest to sustain legislation that singles out the press).
153 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
154 Id. at 229.
155 See Bezanson, supra note 150, at 1360 ("Ragland's reliance on Minneapolis Star
threatens to mask the principles announced earlier and provides lower courts with
little guidance for judging the constitutionality of regulatory schemes affecting the
press.").
156 Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 591.
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In Minneapolis Star, only newspapers spending more than $100,000
were granted the exemption, while in Ragland only special interest
magazines were exempt from paying taxes. Because the NPA simi-
larly allows exemptions only to JOAs comprised of newspapers that
are "published in one or more issues weekly," ' 7 it would be held
unconstitutional under this rationale.
Lower courts have rejected first amendment challenges based
on potential harm to smaller newspapers that are forced to compete
with the more powerful newspapers in aJOA.' 5 8 In Bay Guardian Co.
v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 159 the court refused to find a first amend-
ment violation on the ground that the NPA did not actively authorize
conduct but merely served as a limited repeal of the antitrust laws.
1 60
Bay Guardian was decided more than ten years before Minneapolis Star
and Ragland; 6' a court addressing a similar challenge today would
likely require at least a compelling state interest to sustain the dis-
puted statute.
1 6 2
157 15.U.S.C. § 1802(4) (1982).
158 See Committee for an Indep. P-I v. Hearst Corp., 704 F.2d 467, 482 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983); Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Publishing Co.,
344 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 1972). For a more in-depth discussion of the
financial problems faced by aJOA's smaller competitors, see infra notes 170-79 and
accompanying text.
159 344 F. Supp. 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
160 See id. at 1157-58.
161 Although Hearst was decided two months after the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Minneapolis Star, the Hearst court did not cite Minneapolis Star and
appears to have either ignored or been unaware of its relevance. Instead, the Hearst
court relied heavily upon Bay Guardian in determining that the JOA in question did
not violate first amendment rights. See Hearst, 704 F.2d at 482-83. The Hearst court
additionally claimed that there was no first amendment violation because the NPA's
exemption would in no way affect the content of the smaller newspaper's speech. See
id. at 483. This argument ignores the NPA's potential to chill the speech of the larger
newspapers involved in a JOA. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
Bay Guardian was decided 11 years before Minneapolis Star. It is unlikely that the
NPA would survive first amendment scrutiny as defined by the Minneapolis Star Court.
Minneapolis Star declared that "[a] tax [and implicitly any legislation] that burdens
rights protected by the First Amendment cannot stand unless the burden is necessary
to achieve an overriding governmental interest." Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 582.
Had the Bay Guardian court applied this strict scrutiny of review, it would have
inquired whether the Act had exceeded permissive bounds in achieving its avowed
purpose. The Bay Guardian court instead evaluated the plaintiff's claim of
overbreadth using a mere rationality test, see Bay Guardian, 344 F. Supp. at 1155; the
Minneapolis Star Court's implication of first amendment rights would compel the Bay
Guardian court to apply strict scrutiny to this claim.
162 Although the Minneapolis Star Court condemned legislation that singles out
the press for special treatment, it intimated that such legislation would be upheld if a
sufficiently compelling government interest could be articulated. See Minneapolis Star,
460 U.S. at 586-90. Lower courts citing Minneapolis Star have recognized that a
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Despite the present ambiguity, the principles underlying Minne-
apolis Star remain a vital component of any evaluation of economic
legislation directed at newspapers. The Minneapolis Star Court based
its decision upon its concern that differential treatment of newspa-
pers threatens the operation of a free press and ultimately hinders
the unfettered exchange of ideas;' 6 3 the "threat of burdensome
taxes" imposed solely on the press could operate "as effectively as a
censor to check critical comment by the press, undercutting the basic
assumption of our political system that the press will often serve as
an important restraint on government." '6 4 The Court thus invali-
dated the statute because governmental power to confer a harm or
benefit may lead newspapers to exercise extreme caution and ulti-
mately may chill the free expression of editorial opinion.
This concern was recently reiterated by the Court in City of Lake-
wood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. 165 The Lakewood Court held uncon-
stitutional an ordinance allowing the Mayor of Lakewood unbridled
discretion to grant or deny permit applications to publishers seeking
narrowly tailored means to achieve a compelling state interest is necessary to justify
special regulation of speech. See, e.g., Smith v. Butterworth, 866 F.2d 1318, 1320
(I Ith Cir.) ("Even where a sufficiently compelling state interest can be shown, those
arguing in favor of a regulation's validity must further demonstrate that its goal
cannot be achieved by means that do not infringe as significantly on first amendment
rights."), petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3828 (May 26, 1989) (No. 88-1993);
Hornstein v. Hartigan, 676 F. Supp. 894, 896 (C.D. Ill. 1988) ("Although general
economic regulation of the press is permissible, differential taxation based on
content is valid only if the state can show that the regulation serves a compelling state
interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.").
The NPA was allegedly passed to serve the governmental interest of
"maintaining a newspaper press editorially and reportorially independent and
competitive in all parts of the United States." 15 U.S.C. § 1801 (1982). Although
the preservation of independent news voices is a significant interest, it is not
sufficiently compelling to outweigh the danger posed to existing free voices.
Furthermore, the NPA may be construed as a roundabout attempt to equalize voices,
which is precisely the type of conduct the Supreme Court prohibited in Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See infra text accompanying notes 193-94 (discussing the
Court's reasoning in Buckley). This interest also becomes less compelling in light of
the NPA's general failure to achieve its avowed goals. See supra notes 47-66 and
accompanying text. Even if the governmental goals were sufficiently "compelling" to
justify regulation, a law that permitted joinder of business operations but that did not
grant exemptions from the antitrust laws would constitute a more narrowly tailored
means of achieving those goals. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
163 See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585. Because, despite its sweeping reach,
Minneapolis Star addressed only legislation that "singles out" the press, it is unclear
whether a court following Minneapolis Star would be obliged to strike down a general
regulation that does not expressly single out the press but is most acutely felt by the
press. Such an inquiry is, however, beyond the scope of this Comment.
164 Id.
165 108 S. Ct. 2138 (1988).
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to place their newsracks on public property. The Court expressed its
fear that newspapers seeking permit approval would refrain from
criticizing an incumbent mayor, and invalidated the ordinance for its
impermissible interference with the newspapers' content.' 66
Criticisms resembling those made by the Court in Minneapolis
Star and Lakewood have been leveled at the NPA. One opponent
denounced the relationship between government and newspapers
under the NPA as "government-licensed journalism" that "often
puts newspapers in bed with government."'167 In a similar vein, the
newspapers involved in the proposed JOA in Detroit have been
accused of allowing their desire for the approval of their proposed
JOA to color their editorial content. This desire allegedly motivated
the refusal of the Detroit Free Press to publish editorial cartoons unfa-
vorable to then-Attorney General Edwin Meese during the period in
which he was to rule on the proposed JOA. 6 s That "[e]ven a news-
paper known for its ethics since the days of Jack Knight, stoops to
prostitution as it embarrassingly begs for governmental blessing," 1
69
suggests that, like the ordinance in Lakewood and the use tax in Min-
neapolis Star, the antitrust exemption permitted by the NPA engen-
ders subtle but inevitable government interference with editorial
judgment.
166 See id. at 2144 ("It is not difficult to visualize a newspaper that relies to a
substantial degree on single issue sales feeling significant pressure to endorse the
incumbent Mayor in an upcoming election, or to refrain from criticizing him, in order
to receive a favorable and speedy disposition on its permit application.").
167 NPA Oversight Hearing, supra note 42 (statement of Bruce B. Brugman, editor
and publisher of the San Francisco Bay Guardian, at 5-6) (presenting examples of
alleged cooperation between the newspapers in the San Francisco JOA and the San
Francisco city government); see also id. (statement of W. Edward Wendover, Editor
and Publisher, The Community Crier, Canton, Michigan, at 2) (claiming that "the [NPA]
is flawed because there is no real way to separate granting JOAs, regulation and
enforcement from politics").
168 See Knight, A Sad Story at Knight-Ridder, Wash. Post, Aug. 2, 1988, at Cl, col.
2 (accusing Knight-Ridder of "tak[ing] the prize for perfidy" by ordering two
editorial cartoonists of the Free Press "to go easy on Meese" during the period in
which Meese was considering their JOA application); see also Barnett, The Detroit
Newspaper Wars: Competition is Now Up to the Courts, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1988, at C3,
col. I ("Members and friends of [Knight-Ridder, owner of the Free Press] have
watched in dismay as the news pages of The Free Press were commandeered for the
publisher's public relations campaign to influence Mr. Meese and as editorial
cartoons critical of Mr. Meese were banned."); Pelham, Clifford Defends Media
Deal..and His Honor, Legal Times, Sept. 12, 1988, at 1 ("Fearful of offending Meese,
who would make the final decision on the proposal, editors of the Free Press decided
not to run editorial cartoons about the embattled attorney general.").
169 NPA Oversight Hearing, supra note 42 (statement of W. Edward, Wendover,
Editor and Publisher, The Community Crier, Canton, Michigan, at 3).
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B. Creation of Economic Barriers to Entry
The legitimacy of the NPA is compromised by its inability to
serve its avowed purposes; the Act's dangers extend, however,
beyond mere legislative failure. By erecting an almost impenetrable
barrier to entry into the newspaper market, the NPA allows publish-
ers involved in a JOA to enjoy monopolistic advantages.' 70  In
severely limiting other newspapers' access to the market, the NPA
impedes the right to publish guaranteed by the first amendment.
During the Congressional debates over the NPA's passage, one
of the principal arguments advanced by the Act's proponents con-
cerned the status of the newspaper industry as a "natural monop-
oly.' 17 ' By one proponent's own admission, a year before the Act's
passage, forty-five cities still enjoyed independent newspaper com-
petition.' 72 Similarly, legislators urging the NPA's passage could
point only to an emerging "trend" towards natural monopoly, rather
than a complete establishment of such a phenomenon.' 73 Courts
evaluatingJOAs have been similarly inconclusive in defining the eco-
nomic structure of the newspaper industry. In Michigan Citizens, for
example, the court noted that "[i]t is not at all clear whether the
newspaper business in some cities is a natural monopoly, and, if so,
in cities of what size.
'' 7 4
Whether a natural monopoly actually exists in the newspaper
170 See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 23,150 (1970) (statement of Rep. MacGregor)
("Passage of [the NPA] will lessen competition by handicapping the ability of other
newspapers to be established, to grow and to provide the public with an independent
view of the news."); Busterna, supra note 83, at 10-11 ("The Act allows two
newspapers to set 'voluntary' combination rates that virtually close out a third
newspaper from the advertising revenue market.").
171 See 116 CONG. REC. 23,148 (1970) (statement ofRep. McCulloch) (justifying
the Act as necessary to preserve editorial and reportorial diversity in the face of
conditions leading to "a stultifying monopoly on news and opinion"). A natural
monopoly market is a market which is more efficiently served by one firm than by two
or more firms. For a detailed discussion of the "natural monopoly" phenomenon,
see Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis of the Cable
Television Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1335, 1340-45 (1986).
172 See 116 CONG. REC. 23,148 (1970) (statement of Rep. McCulloch).
173 See, e.g., id. at 23,148 (statement of Rep. McCulloch) ("Often where once
there were two independent newspaper voices, a newspaper failure or merger has
ended competition and tended to produce a stultifying monopoly on news and
opinion." (emphasis added)); id. at 23,154 (statement of Rep. Railsback) ("The
history of the newspaper industry strikingly reveals the dangerous trend toward a
complete elimination of competition between daily newspapers in the same city."
(emphasis added)).
174 Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1296
(D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1952 (1989).
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industry is, however, irrelevant because the NPA provides publishers
forming JOAs with monopolistic advantages far exceeding the
advantages of a natural monopoly.1 75 Savings from economies of
scale and from combined production and distribution are supple-
mented by profits garnered through activities such as price-fixing,
profit-pooling, and market allocation. Such practices are normally
prohibited by the antitrust laws but are permitted under the NPA's
exemption from such laws. 176 Furthermore, despite the NPA's
avowed goal of preserving multiple autonomous newspapers, JOAs
actually "raise[ ] an entry barrier that would not have existed had
one of the newspapers gone out of business or if the two newspapers
had merged."'
177
The NPA also deters would-be publishers by permitting
monopolistic advertising practices that create economic obstacles
and impede successful market penetration. A common pricing tech-
nique permitted under the NPA involves "cartel" rates, in which
newspapers operating under a JOA offer an advertiser the opportu-
nity to place an advertisement in both newspapers for a charge that
slightly exceeds the cost of advertising in only one newspaper. This
practice forces potential competitors to undersell not only the indi-
175 This argument is particularly compelling when, as in the Detroit JOA, the
participants are members of newspaper chains. Two newspapers in a given city
under common ownership may engage in internal price-fixing and profit-pooling;
these practices are, however, even more destructive when backed by the substantial
financial resources enjoyed by powerful chains. See Note, supra note 32, at 691-95.
176 See 15 U.S.C. § 1802 (1982); see also Comment, The Newspaper Preservation Act:
Why it Fails to Preserve Newspapers, 17 AKRON L. REv. 435, 448-49 (1984) (arguing that a
JOA fosters newspaper monopolies by encouraging combined production and
distribution efforts that result in cost savings and economies of scale for JOA
participants which bar other papers from entering the market); Note, supra note 12, at
400-03 (discussing the anti-competitive effects of JOAs, including combined
advertising rates that prohibit market entry, and the effects of profit-pooling and
market allocation); Note, supra note 32, at 690 (discussing the monopolistic
advantages achieved through combined production and distribution operations).
177 Busterna, supra note 83, at 10. This accusation may be based upon the
assumption that a new market entrant faces a more substantial barrier to entry when
it seeks to penetrate a market in which there are two newspapers than when it
attempts to enter a market dominated by only one newspaper. Newspapers joined in
aJOA offer each other no competition, but they are the equivalent of two newspapers
operating in one market; as such, they create a barrier to entry that would not have
existed had the papers merged into one paper or had one gone out of business. See id.
JOAs also prove more of a deterrent than mergers because merged firms may
"dissipat[e] a portion of the assets of the single firm that remain[s] in existence" to
finance the merger, whereas in a JOA, "the assets of two or more separate
enterprises are pooled together and retained in an existing operation. These assets
[thus] are not available for reinvestment in other newspaper ventures." S. REP. No.
535, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1969).
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vidual rates of the two joint-operating newspapers but also the incre-
mental cost of advertising in the second paper participating in the
JOA.178 Smaller newspapers, which already face substantial disad-
vantages in an industry heavily dependent upon economies of scale,
lose all remaining incentives to enter markets dominated byJOAs. 179
Accordingly, JOAs stifle the growth of existing smaller newspa-
pers and make continued competition nearly impossible. Despite
Congress' recognition that "enactment of [the NPA] would be detri-
mental to the successful operation of small weekly papers soliciting
advertising," 8 0 the final version of the NPA failed to require or even
allow inquiry into the potential impact of a JOA on existing
competitors. 181
In the absence of the NPA, failing newspapers would create mar-
ket openings that could be filled by "stronger and more viable
voice[s]" that would better serve the community. 182 Instead, the
market barriers created by the NPA constrain the industry and frus-
trate the legislative goal of "furthering editorial independence and
diversity."' 183 In so conditioning the right to publish on financial
means, the NPA abridges critical first amendment rights.
This theory was most recently advanced by the plaintiff in Hearst,
which claimed that the proposed JOA between the Seattle newspa-
pers "would impair the first amendment rights of smaller newspa-
pers in the market."' 84 In dismissing the first amendment claim as
lacking "substantial merit,"' 85 the Hearst court invoked prior district
178 See Busterna, supra note 83, at 11-12.
179 See, e.g., Note, supra note 32, at 689-90 & nn.146-47 (Arguing that because of
aJOA's ability to combine advertising rates, "[e]ntry barriers, which are already high
in the newspaper industry, become nearly insurmountable as a result of a [JOA].
Entry into ajoint operating market is even more difficult than entry into a monopoly
market."); Note, supra note 12, at 401 ("[F]ar from preserving independent sources
of news, the antitrust exemption embodied in the NPA, by permitting combined
advertising rates, will serve to eliminate small competing newspapers excluded from
these arrangements and bar the entry of new competitors.").
180 116 CONG. REc. 23,156 (1970) (statement of Rep. Feighan).
181 See Note, supra note 32, at 691.
182 See 116 CONG. REc. 23,143 (1970) (statement of Rep. Thompson). This
argument focuses primarily on the potential market entry of new daily competitors as
a means of checking monopolistic control of the press. But cf. Glassman, supra note
82, at 11 (arguing that a monopoly does not exist in the newspaper industry because
even in cities with only one daily paper, non-daily papers are entering the market and
rapidly increasing circulation).
183 Note, supra note 32, at 691.
184 Committee for an Indep. P-I v. Hearst Corp., 704 F.2d 467, 482 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983).
185 Id.
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court decisions holding that the Act did not abridge first amendment
rights. Those decisions, however, were premised on an interpreta-
tion of the NPA as "a narrow exception to the antitrust laws for
newspapers in danger of failing .... [which] in many respects [is]
merely a codification of the judicially created 'failing company' doc-
trine."' 86 The broader, more recent judicial and administrative
interpretations of the NPA refute this position by requiring neither a
lack of alternate purchasers nor a plunge into a "downward spi-
ral"'1 7 to exempt aJOA from the antitrust laws. These recent inter-
pretations directly contravene the assumptions of the district court
decisions underlying Hearst.
Recent case law, as illustrated by the Michigan Citizens decision,
has departed abruptly from precedent. JOAs are no longer granted
solely as a last resort to salvage financially troubled newspapers. The
Michigan Citizens court ignored both the presence of reasonable alter-
natives to aJOA 88 and the absence of an economic "downward spi-
ral," thereby effectively rejecting the traditional two-prong test. In
so doing, it discarded the traditional narrow application of the NPA
and negated the reasoning of the earlier courts cited in Hearst, which
had relied upon that narrow application in concluding that the NPA
did not violate the first amendment. These recent judicial interpre-
tations have "rewritten" the NPA so that first amendment objections
to the Act can no longer summarily be rejected by invoking prece-
dent; those decisions are effectively based upon on an essentially dif-
ferent NPA. Threats to first amendment freedoms are far more
formidable under an overreaching NPA than under one which is
fairly contained.
Claims that the NPA violates the first amendment must also be
addressed in light of Supreme Court precedent establishing that the
right to publish cannot be conditioned upon financial means. This
principle was most clearly articulated in Associated Press v. United
States, 80 which held that the Sherman Act was violated by the restric-
tive by-laws of a news gathering agency. The Associated Press Court
rejected the notion that the first amendment provided immunity for
publishers from antitrust laws, holding instead that "[t]he First
Amendment affords not the slightest support for the contention that
186 Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 344 F. Supp. 1155, 1157
(N.D. Cal. 1972); see also City & County of Honolulu v. Hawaii Newspaper Agency,
Inc., 559 F.. Supp. 1021, 1030 (D. Haw. 1983).
187 See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
188 See supra text accompanying note 118.
189 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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a combination to restrain trade in news and views has any constitu-
tional immunity."'"9
The Hearst court held Associated Press inapplicable and limited the
decision's impact to the facts of that particular case. 9 ' In doing so,
the court ignored the powerful language in Associated Press mandating
that all freedom to publish be uncircumscribed by financial barriers:
Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some. Free-
dom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to
combine to keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of the
press from governmental interference under the First Amendment
does not sanction repression of that freedom by private
interests.1
9 2
That first amendment rights may in no way be abridged on
account of financial status was vehemently reinforced in Buckley v.
Valeo. 193 In Buckley, the Court held that the provisions of the Federal
Election Campaign Act limiting contributions to candidates for fed-
eral elective office violated the first amendment freedom of expres-
sion. The Court acknowledged the merits of the statutory goal of
equalizing influence on elections but maintained that "the First
Amendment's protection against governmental abridgement of free
expression cannot properly be made to depend on a person's finan-
cial ability to engage in public discussion.
'' 9 4
Associated Press and Buckley establish that the right to publish may
not be circumscribed by financial constraints. The economic power
that accrues to members of aJOA impermissibly treads upon the first
amendment rights of smaller competitors and would-be market
entrants. In holding that no first amendment violation existed, the
Hearst court presumed that the NPA's antitrust exemption did not
affect "the content of speech" of smaller newspapers.' 95 The lack of
alternative voices in a JOA-dominated market, however, effectively
intrudes upon the content of speech both by discouraging the
expression of existing papers and by preventing newspapers from
entering the market. The NPA's unrestrained scope unduly infringes
190 Id. at 20.
191 See Committee for an Indep. P-I v. Hearst Corp., 704 F.2d 467, 483 (9th
Cir.) ("[T]he [Associated Press] Court held only that the first amendment does not
insulate news-gathering organizations from the antitrust laws."), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
892 (1983).
192 Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20.
193 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
194 Id. at 49.
195 Hearst, 704 F.2d at 483.
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on both the would-be publisher's right to publish and the public's




The Supreme Court's decision to review the recentJOA contro-
versy in Detroit reaffirms the need for judicial and legislative reex-
amination of the NPA in light of its failure to achieve its avowed
purposes. 97 The NPA has neither increased editorial quality and
diversity nor halted the decline of two-newspaper cities. Instead, it
has inhibited first amendment rights by erecting additional economic
barriers to entry in a newspaper industry already dominated by large
corporate chains. The NPA has further augmented these chains'
power because its vague language has been subject to judicial and
administrative manipulation, which has generated unnecessaryJOAs
such as the one recently disputed in Detroit. The blanket approval
given to JOAs ignores the government's lack of Constitutional power
to enforce the NPA and creates the potential for further first amend-
ment infringement.
196 Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20.
197 Less drastic measures than an outright repeal of the NPA have been
suggested. See, e.g., NPA Oversight Hearing, supra note 42 (statement of Robert Picard,
at 4-5) (setting forth 10 suggestions for amending the Act, including the elimination
of price fixing and profit pooling); Lacy, supra note 132, at 160 (suggesting that
"[r]euniting the advertising and business departments with the editorial
departments, while keeping production and distribution separate, might work to
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